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In this paper, we consider one of the important ongoing debates in the growth empirics literature:
the ￿institutions vs. geography￿debate. The key question in this debate is whether geography
has direct e⁄ects on long-run economic performance or if its in￿ uence is limited only to its e⁄ects
on other growth determinants, such as institutions. Attempts to resolve this debate have centered
on the use of linear cross-country regressions where the dependent variable is purchasing-power
parity adjusted GDP per capita in 1995 while proxies for institutional quality, macroeconomic
policies, and geographic endowments form the set of regressors. Acemoglu et. al. (2001), Easterly
and Levine (2003), and Rodrik et. al. (2004) conclude that geography￿ s in￿ uence on long-run
income levels is solely indirect through its e⁄ects on institutions, while Sachs (2003) argues that
their conclusions are overturned once a measure of malaria transmission is included. Sachs goes
further by suggesting that the search for mono-causal e⁄ects of fundamental growth determinants
on growth may be misdirected. He concludes that, ￿[t]here is good theoretical and empirical reason
to believe that the development process re￿ ects a complex interaction of institutions, policies, and
geography [Sachs (2003), p. 9]￿ .
We re-evaluate, in this paper, the conclusions in the institutions versus geography debate by taking
Sachs￿ observation above seriously. Linear cross-country regression exercises potentially ignore
possible misspeci￿cation of the long-run development process. However, there is both substantial
theoretical and empirical support for heterogeneity in the cross-country development process.
Canova (1999), Desdoigts (1999), Durlauf and Johnson (1995), Durlauf, Kourtellos, and Minkin
(2000), and Mamuneas, Savvides, and Stengos (2006) all ￿nd substantial heterogeneity in growth
processes across countries using a range of empirical approaches. Further, theoretical work such as
the seminal work of Azariadis and Drazen (1990) on threshold externalities as well as the recent
work on endogenous economic take-o⁄s (see the survey by Galor (2005)) suggest that heterogeneity
across countries may be characterized by threshold nonlinearities.
It is unclear whether previous ￿ndings based on the assumption of linearity will be robust once we
account for speci￿cation issues such as nonlinearity and parameter heterogeneity suggested by the
broader growth literature. In this paper, we model nonlinearity and heterogeneity using sample
splitting and threshold regression methods (Hansen (2000), Caner and Hansen (2004)). These
methods internally sort the data, on the basis of some threshold variable, into groups of observations
each of which obeys the same model. This allows researchers to consider di⁄erences in the marginal
e⁄ects of growth determinants (e.g., disease ecology) depending on whether the value of some other
growth variable (e.g., institutions) exceeds a threshold level (split value). The attractiveness of this
model stems from the fact that it does not treat the split value as predetermined by the researcher,
but as a parameter to be estimated. The threshold regression model is therefore a particularly
1appropriate alternative to the linear model in empirical growth research as it nests the latter, but
allows the growth researcher to investigate the possibility of threshold nonlinearities in the growth
process and also to uncover the interactions between various growth determinants and their e⁄ects
on long-run development.
This work is not the ￿rst to employ sample splitting and threshold regression methods to a problem
in empirical growth. However, previous work using threshold models to account for parameter
heterogeneity in growth (e.g., Papageorgiou (2002), Tan (2009)) have assumed that the threshold
variable is exogenous. This assumption may be plausible if geography1 variables were responsible
for the threshold e⁄ect, but certainly not if institutional quality was the threshold variable since
the literature has argued strongly that institutions are endogenous. In this paper, we revisit the
institutions versus geography debate within the framework of Kourtellos, Stengos, and Tan (2009);
henceforth KST, where we consider a threshold regression model with an endogenous threshold
variable. KST can be viewed as an extension of work by Bai and Perron (1998), Hansen (2000),
and others who consider threshold models with both exogenous threshold and slope variables, and
Caner and Hansen (2004) who then allow for endogeneity in the slope variables.
The main strategy in KST is to exploit the intuition obtained from the limited dependent variable
literature, and to relate the problem of having an endogenous threshold variable with the analogous
problem of having an endogenous dummy variable or sample selection in the limited dependent
variable framework. However, as we pointed out in that paper, there is one important di⁄erence.
While in limited dependent variable models, we observe the assignment of observations into groups
but the (threshold) variable that drives this assignment is taken to be latent, here, we have
the opposite: we do not know which observations belong to which group (we do not know the
split value), but we can observe the threshold variable. KST show that, just as in the limited
dependent variable framework, consistent estimation of parameters requires the inclusion of a set
of inverse Mills ratio bias correction terms. Therefore, threshold regression methods that ignore
the endogeneity of the threshold variable will generate parameter estimates that are inconsistent.
Analogous to Caner and Hansen (2004), KST propose a concentrated least squares estimator for
the threshold parameter and estimate the slope parameters by GMM based on the sample split
implied by the threshold estimate, which is shown to be consistent and they provide guidance for
inference.
When we apply KST to growth data, we ￿nd results that o⁄er a markedly more nuanced view
from those in the existing institutions versus geography debate where the presence of possible
heterogeneity is ignored. Our results also di⁄er substantially from those obtained using methods
that ignore the possible endogeneity of the threshold variable. Our results certainly con￿rm that the
1Though both Brock and Durlauf (2001) and Deaton (2009) have pointed out that just because variables are
predetermined or external does not automatically make them exogenous.
2quality of institutions is an important growth determinant. But, what they really highlight is the
role of institutional quality in classifying countries into two long-run development regimes. If the
quality of institutions is su¢ ciently high, then both institutions and geography proponents would
agree that higher levels of institutional quality have a positive and signi￿cant impact on long-run
per capita income. Geography proponents could also legitimately argue that disease prevalence
has a signi￿cant negative impact on long-run performance. However, for low-quality institutions
countries, institutions and geography proponents are likely to hold to their positions and bitterly
disagree over the true deep determinant of under-development. Our ￿ndings therefore a¢ rm Sachs￿
conjecture; the development process certainly appears to be an outcome of complex interactions
between fundamental causes.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model and the setup. Finally, section 3
provides the results from our empirical application.
2 The Structural Threshold Regression (STR) model
Consider the following structural threshold regression (STR) model of log income per capita
yi = x0
i￿1 + ui; qi ￿ ￿ (2.1)
yi = x0
i￿2 + ui; qi > ￿ (2.2)
where yi is the log income per capita in country i; qi is an endogenous threshold variable (such as the
quality of institutions) with ￿ being the sample split value, xi is a vector of growth determinants;
￿1 and ￿2 are regime-speci￿c slope coe¢ cients, and ui is an error. We assume that E(uijzi) = 0
where zi is a l ￿1 vector of instruments with l ￿ p where p is the number of endogenous variables.
We assume a random sample fyi;xi;qi;zi;uign
i=1: A reduced form equation for qi is given by
qi = z0
i￿q + vq;i (2.3)
where E(vq;ijzi) = 0:
STR is similar in nature to the case of the error interdependence that exists in limited dependent
variable models between the equation of interest and the sample selection equation; see Heckman
(1979). For example, in the endogenous dummy model, the variable qi that determines the
assignment of observations to regimes is latent, but the assignment is known (given by the dummy
variable). However, in the STR case, we observe qi, but the sample split value ￿ is unknown, and
we estimate it.
3Hence, as in the limited dependent case, under joint normality of (ui;vq;i); we have the following
conditional expectations

























i￿q) are the inverse Mills ratio bias correction terms, and ￿(￿) and ￿(￿) are the
Normal pdf and cdf, respectively.
Let I(￿) be an indicator function that de￿nes two regimes depending on the value of the threshold
variable qi; where I(qi ￿ ￿) = 1. Further de￿ne ￿i(￿)=￿1 (￿ ￿ z0
i￿q)I(qi ￿ ￿)+￿2 (￿ ￿ z0
i￿q)(1 ￿
I(qi ￿ ￿)) and ￿ = ￿1 ￿ ￿2: Then we can rewrite the STR model as a single equation
yi = x0
i￿ + x0
i;￿￿ + ￿￿i(￿) + "i (2.6)
where "i is a regression error.
Notice that when the threshold variable qi is exogenous, i.e. ￿ = 0; (2.6) becomes the threshold
regression model of Hansen (2000). Additionally, when xi is also endogenous then we get the
threshold regression model of Caner and Hansen (2004). In both cases, the inverse Mills ratio bias
correction terms are omitted so that naively estimating the STR model using Hansen (2000) or
Caner and Hansen (2004) would generally result in inconsistent estimation. In a series of Monte
Carlo exercises, KST con￿rm that this is indeed the case.
We estimate the parameters of (2.6) in three steps. First, we estimate the reduced form
parameter ￿q in (2.3) by LS and obtain b ￿i(￿) = b ￿1;i(￿) + b ￿2;i(￿),with b ￿1;i(￿) = ￿1 (￿ ￿ z0
ib ￿q)
and b ￿2;i(￿) = ￿2 (￿ ￿ z0
ib ￿q): Second, we estimate the threshold parameter ￿ by minimizing a
Concentrated Least Squares (CLS) criterion






i;￿￿ ￿ ￿b ￿i(￿))2 (2.7)
Finally, once we obtain the split samples implied by b ￿, we estimate the slope parameters using
GMM.
Using a similar set of assumptions as in Hansen (2000) and Caner and Hansen (2004), KST show
that the STR estimator is consistent. They further obtain asymptotic con￿dence intervals for ￿
using a suggestion by Seo and Linton (2007).
43 The Institutions versus Geography Debate
In this section, we revisit the institutions versus geography debate. Our work follows most closely
Rodrik et. al. The data we use also comes primarily from that paper. The dependent variable is
the log of GDP per capita in 1995. As in Rodrik et. al., the set of regressors consists of a measure
of institutional quality, the rule of law index (RULE); a measure of trade openness, the logarithm
of the ratio of nominal imports plus exports relative to GDP in purchasing power parity-adjusted
US dollars (LNOPEN); and two alternative geography measures, distance from the equator of the
capital city (DISTEQ) and the malaria index in 1994 (MALFAL94). We consider the sample of
countries that corresponds to Rodrik et. al.￿ s large cross-country set since their ￿ndings were
shown to be robust to sample variations. Here, RULE is instrumented using the proportion of the
population that speaks either English (ENGFRAC) or a major European language (EURFRAC),
as suggested by Hall and Jones (1999). We instrument the trade openness variable with Frankel
and Romer￿ s (1999) logarithm of predicted trade shares variable (LOGFRANKROM). Following
Sachs, we also instrument MALFAL94 using an index of malaria ecology (ME).
Table 1 presents our main ￿ndings. We contrast results where the model is assumed to be linear
(columns (1)-(2)) against those where the model is a threshold regression model (columns (3)-
(10)) that sorts the countries into two regimes. We found evidence for RULE as an endogenous
threshold variable. Each threshold model presents the sample split value and the corresponding
90% con￿dence interval. We also present the GMM slope estimates for each regime.
The linear GMM results replicate those in the literature. When DISTEQ is the geography variable,
we ￿nd, as Rodrik et. al. do, that RULE is the only variable to have a signi￿cant impact on long-run
performance (column 1). However, when we replace DISTEQ with MALFAL94, as recommended
by Sachs, we ￿nd, as he does, that both RULE and MALFAL94 have signi￿cant e⁄ects on long-run
performance. As expected, in both these cases, higher institutional quality was found to be good
for long-run performance, while, in the latter case, more severe disease prevalence was shown to
have a negative impact (column 2).
When we account for heterogeneity, however, we ￿nd that STR delivers more nuanced results
compared to the established ￿ndings based on the linear model. Compared to Rodrik et. al.￿ s
￿ndings, the STR GMM results (columns (5) and (6)) suggest that there exists substantial
heterogeneity in the e⁄ect of institutional quality on long-run performance for countries above and
below a threshold level. For countries with RULE below -0.736, which corresponds to Pakistan,
the marginal impact of improving institutional quality is about 5.5 times larger than that for
countries above the threshold value. A one standard deviation improvement of institutional quality
would raise long-run performance by 3.3 standard deviations for the low-quality institutions set
of countries compared to only less than 0.6 for the higher-quality institutions group. Hence, for
5this exercise, while the STR GMM results do a¢ rm that ￿institutions rule￿overall, we ￿nd that
institutions are particularly important for the worst-o⁄ countries.
Similarly, our STR GMM results (columns (9) and (10)) for the case where MALFAL94 replaces
DISTEQ do support Sachs￿ ￿nding that ￿malaria transmission, which is strongly a⁄ected by
ecological conditions, directly a⁄ects the level of per capita income after controlling for the quality of
institutions [Sachs (2003), Abstract]￿ . We ￿nd that MALFAL94 has a signi￿cant negative impact on
long-run performance for both low- and high-institutions countries. However, institutional quality
(RULE) only has a signi￿cant positive impact on long-run performance after countries exceed a
threshold level (RULE > -0.195; which corresponds to China). This ￿nding actually strengthens
Sach￿ s position since it suggests that the only thing that could deliver marginal improvements for
the worst-o⁄countries is the alleviation of the negative e⁄ects of a disadvantageous disease ecology.
For this group of countries, small changes to institutional quality are unlikely to do much good
(unless it gets the country above the threshold point).
Our STR results also contrast with those obtained using Caner and Hansen￿ s (IVTR; 2004) approach
that allows for slope covariates to be endogenous, but maintains the assumption of an exogenous
threshold variable. We showed in the discussion in the previous section, and also using Monte
Carlo experiments that are reported in KST, that the omission of the inverse Mills ratio bias
correction terms results in the estimators for the slope parameters for IVTR to be inconsistent.
However, IVTR has seen recent popularity in its application to growth empirics (e.g., Papageorgiou
(2002)), so we also compare our STR ￿ndings to those of IVTR. In comparison to STR, for the
Rodrik et. al. speci￿cation, the IVTR results (columns (3) and (4)) provide weaker support
for Rodrik et. al.￿ s ￿ndings. The IVTR results suggest that institutional quality only matters
strongly (at the 1% signi￿cance level) after a country has attained a minimum level (RULE >
0.231; which corresponds to India). Below that level, variations in none of the growth determinants
has any in￿ uence on long-run performance at the 5% level. Similarly, the IVTR ￿ndings for the
Sachs speci￿cation (columns (7) and (8)) also dilute the importance of MALFAL94. In contrast
to the STR ￿ndings, the IVTR results suggest that the negative impact of disease prevalence
only applies to the worst-o⁄ countries. For high-quality institutions countries, only continued
improvements in institutions would deliver signi￿cant (positive) marginal payo⁄s in terms of better
long-run performance. The sharp di⁄erences between the STR and IVTR ￿ndings suggest that
not accounting for the endogeneity of the threshold variable in threshold regression exercises could
deliver conclusions that are highly misleading in practice.
In sum, we conclude that our ￿ndings di⁄er substantially from those obtained from methods that
either ignore the presence of thresholds altogether or ignore the possible endogeneity of the threshold
variable. There is much evidence to suggest that there exists substantial heterogeneity in the growth
experiences of countries, and that studies that seek to promote mono-causal explanations for the
6variation in long-run economic performance across countries are potentially misleading.
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8Table 1: Regressions of log per capita GDP  
 
             
IVTR-GMM 
   
  Linear-GMM  IVTR-GMM  THRET-GMM  THRET-GMM 
             
Threshold      q=Rule  q=Rule  q=Rule  q=Rule 
Sample Split      0.231 
[ 0.158, 0.231 ] 
  -0.736 
[ -0.867, -0.736 ] 
0.231  -0.195 
90 % CI      [ 0.158, 0.551]  [ -0.442, 0.722] 
      q≤  0.231  q> 0.231  q≤  -0.736  q> -0.736  q≤  0.231  q> 0.231  q≤  -0.195  q> -0.195 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10) 







*  0.407  0.938
*  1.208  1.102
* 
  (0.287)  (0.148)  (3.087)  (0.284)  (1.405)  (0.254)  (0.878)  (0.379)  (0.802)  (0.405) 
                     
LNOPEN  -0.286  -0.034  -0.995  0.038  0.487  0.074  0.058  -0.015  0.371  0.050 
  (0.255)  (0.178)  (1.090)  (0.110)  (0.667)  (0.153)  (0.212)  (0.169)  (0.467)  (0.136) 
                     
DISTEQ  0.001  -  -0.031  0.002  -0.012  0.003  -  -  -  - 
  (0.009)  -  (0.037)  (0.006)  (0.024)  (0.005)  -  -  -  - 
                     
MALFAL94  -  -1.375
*  -  -  -  -  -1.436
*  -0.763  -1.324
*  -1.243
* 
  -  (0.213)  -  -  -  -  (0.215)  (0.987)  (0.391)  (0.252) 
No. of 
observations  120  120  76  44  28  92  70  37  55  52 
J-stat: χ
2(1)  6.555  1.350  1.647  0.066  0.628  3.323  2.590  0.274  1.653  0.0183 
All the regressions include an unreported constant. Standard errors are in parentheses.  “*” denotes significance at 1%, “**” at 5%. The quality of institutions 
variable, RULE, is the Rule of Law Index for 2001. The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of per capita GDP in PPP US dollars in 1995.  LNOPEN is the 
natural logarithm of real openness defined by the ratio of nominal imports plus exports to GDP in PPP US dollars. DISTEQ is the distance from Equator of capital 
city measured as abs(Latitude)/90. MALFAL94 is the Malaria index in 1994.  ENGFRAC is the fraction of the population speaking English. EURFRAC is the 
fraction of the population speaking on of the major languages of Western Europe.  LOGFRANKROM is the natural logarithm of predicted trade shares computed 
from a bilateral trade equation with “pure geography” variables. ME is a population weighted Malaria Ecology index that includes temperature, species abundance, 
and vector type (the type of mosquito). We refer the reader to Rodrik et. al. (2004) for detailed data references. 
                           